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ABSTRACT
Corporate law has done a very poor job on executive pay: executives have
been rewarded for stellar "performance" that turned out to be anything but
stellar, and shareholders have had no meaningful recourse. Indeed, there are
many other such cases where there is no breach of the fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty, but the board's behavior nevertheless smacks of a classic agency
problem known as structural bias.
We argue that law on the books and as enforced is not well situated to
deal with structural bias. What does show some promise, however, is the
marshalling of extra-legal forces that effectively extend Delaware corporate
law, constituting a penumbra. Corporate directors' behavior is very much
influenced by what is in the penumbra.
The Delaware judiciar}'s participation in the corporate law debate in fora
other than the courtroom significantly shapes the penumbra. Law firm
memos to clients play an important role too, conveying both the court
holdings and the dicta as advice to clients. The penumbra also includes the
many voices participating in the corporate governance debate through
shareholder proposals, court cases brought about shareholder proposals, and
the views of corporate governance activists. While the penumbra is not an
unambiguous good-certainly, actors with problematic self-interests may be
among those helping shape it it does provide an important counterweight to
the directors' ability to prefer their own interests over those of their
principals, the corporation and its shareholders.
INTRODUCTION
"Harkej 'ije/oiv [Special Committee] member, Simon, brought the scienif concept of
inertia to the Special Committee bj generalj remaining at rest until set into motion b' the
Committee r advisor." '1
E XECUTIVE compensation is much in the news. Executives in the last
few years, especially those in financial service companies, have received
enormous salaries and bonuses to reward them for what appeared to be stellar
performance. But appearances were deceiving: We now see that, certainly for
1. In re Loral Space & Commc'ns, Inc. Consol. ]Litig., Nos. 2808-V7CS, 3022-V7CS, 2008 W]
4293781, at *22 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (Strine, V.C.) (criticizing defendant directors for
the procedure they used in considering a related party transaction).
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financial service companies, and apparently for many other companies as well,
the "performance" was part of an unsustainable bubble. Enormous losses
have followed-enough to wipe out the supposed gains, and then some-but
executives have not been required to return their pay.
We, along with many other commentators, believe that corporate law has
done a very poor job with executive pay, as well as with other manifestations
of structural bias. 2 First, directors of a corporation may be beholden to the
corporation's officers for their jobs. Second, they may abide by a "pernicious
golden rule" under which they defer to the officers as they would have
directors defer to them in their capacities as officers of other corporations.
Third, directors may simply see the world from the same vantage point as the
officers do, a vantage point from which the executive compensation packages
we have seen are reasonable and appropriate. The result, too often, is that
directors rubber-stamp decisions, rather than give them proper consideration.
In this Article, we will show how extra-legal forces, particularly non-
binding pronouncements of the Delaware judiciary, are a critical adjunct to
corporate law, particularly in the area of structural bias. We argued in
previous works that the emerging corporate law on good faith, within the
broader duty of loyalty, might play an important role.3 Delaware courts,
however, seem to be severely limiting the scope of that doctrine. 4 Thus,
extra-legal forces will need to play an increasingly important role.
These extra-legal forces constitute a penumbra that extends Delaware
corporate law significantly beyond law on the books as enforced-a
penumbra that very much influences how corporate directors conduct
2. The term "structural bias" is used in corporate law cases to refer to excessive deference by
the directors to the management because of interlocking relationships or because they
travel in the same social and economic circles. See, e.g., Bcam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1050-51 (Del. 2004); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 .2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984). In our article,
Claire A. Hill & Brett H. Mcl)onnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duy of Laly, 76
FoRDILM L. RhN. 1769 (2007), we defined "structural bias," roughly, as "excessive
deference to the other directors or officers." Id. at 1780. In that article, we distinguished
"suspect motive" cases as "cases where director or officer self interest may be present but
the actions at issue involve core corporate concerns, and hence are appropriately not
scrutinized to the same extent as cases implicating the traditional duty of loyalty." Id. For
purposes of our thesis in this Article, however, both types of cases can be treated under
the general rubric of "structural bias." YA c arc arguing for scrutiny by shaning, not
scrutiny as a technical legal matter; both typcs of cases can benefit equally from the
former type of scrutiny.
3. Hill & McDonnell, siupra note 2, at 1770; Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McL)onnell, Disney,
Good Fait/, and StrllturalBias, 32 J. CoRP. 1. 833, 855-56 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Lyondcll Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 44 (Del. 2009).
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themselves. The penumbra is importantly influenced by the Delaware
corporate judiciary's participation in the corporate law debate in fora other
than the courtroom. Law firm memos and verbal advice to clients play an
important role too, conveying both the court holdings and the dicta as advice
to clients. The penumbra also includes the many voices participating in the
corporate governance debate through shareholder proposals, court cases
regarding shareholder proposals, and the otherwise-expressed views of
corporate governance activists.
In this Article, we will discuss why law on the books and as enforced
cannot properly deal with structural bias. A crucial task for contemporary
corporate governance is to prepare and incentivize directors to be vigorous
and intelligent monitors of corporate management, without creating such risk
of legal liability that no one wants to be a director. The latter consideration
leads corporate law, as developed in statutes and enforced in court decisions,
to be largely rule-based. But corporate actors are very well situated to craft
legalistic modes of compliance that honor the fact but gut the spirit of the
rules. Consider the process established post-Van Gorkom for reviewing
mergers proposed by management, characterized by many as a full
employment act for investment bankers and lawyers at the expense of the
corporation and its shareholders. 5 Thus, standard-like "you know it when
you see it" considerations should inform how corporate actors' conduct is
regulated. But how are the standards established, and what gives them force
without creating too much risk of liability? The penumbra of corporate law.
We fully recognize that the processes that constrain law may not be so
successful at constraining its penumbra-a justified source of concern, given
that extra-legal forces may not always operate for the good. Still, we think
that on balance, a more expansive penumbra of the sort we presently have is
preferable to a less expansive penumbra. For example, consider the effect the
introductory quote is likely to have on the composition and behavior of
special committees. The penumbra serves as a needed counterweight to
structurally-biased boards-something that influences directors to advance
the interests of the corporation.
Our conclusion is nicely illustrated by the debate on executive pay. Law
thus far has been ineffectual at reigning in outsized pay packages, most
notably those that purport (not altogether accurately) to be sensitive to
performance. Certainly, the process in place, according a prominent role to
nominally independent directors, does not do much to help. Independence in
5. See hull & McDonnell, supra note 2, at 1772 n.14.
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mindset is clearly different from independence as defined under the securities
law or the rules of stock exchanges.6 Just as importantly, it is not possible to
craft, much less mandate, bright line, non-gameable rules or procedures by
which compensation can be determined. What we really want is hard to
specify except by reference to what would be awarded by well-informed
businesspeople not influenced by cronyism or the pernicious golden rule. We
think that in this area, the marshalling of extra-legal forces is showing
increasing promise. As more officers voluntarily relinquish their bonuses and
tie their pay more closely to true performance, pressure will grow for others
to do so.7 Delaware judges have weighed in on the issue before, and may
very well do so again. Activist initiatives on the subject have increased as
well. The penumbra may do what law thus far has not been able to do: bring
executive compensation back down to earth and tie it far more successfully to
performance.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines some major background
elements: the basic legal structure of Delaware fiduciary duty law and the
historical growth of the monitoring board model. Part II analyzes how
Delaware law falls short and why it therefore needs a penumbra. We want to
encourage a critical mindset among directors, but cannot readily do so by
imposing outright legal liability for uncritical toadying. Extra-legal forces
offer a way to complement and enhance the force of law. Part III discusses
what others have said about the penumbra. Part IV characterizes the
penumbra itself and how it works to translate pronouncements from
Delaware judges into pressure on directors to show more backbone. Part V
considers the "dark side" of the penumbra: problems created when the
penumbra empowers voices we may not want to empower. Part VI applies
6. See Sccuritics Exchange Act of 1934 : 10_Y(m)(3) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78j
1(m)(3) (2006)); NYSJ, Inc., listed Company Manual § 303,A.02 (2009), available at
http://nysemanual.n)yse'com/lCNTools/I'latform\ iewer.aspselectednode-chp 1 4 &
manual-%2Flcm%2Fscctions%2Flcm sections%2F. The definition of "independence"
in Delaware case law comes much closer to what we would like to sec. See i Nfa notes 56
58 and accompanying text.
7. When AIG's bonuses were announced, the recipients faced death threats, and many chose
to return their bonuses. See Tom Baldwin & C hristine Seib, Armed Guards at AIG Offices
After Death Threats Over Bonuses, TIMES (] ondon), Mar. 18, 2009, at 42, avaIabl at
http: //business.timcsonlinc.c(.uk/ to/business /industry-sectors /banking-and-finance a
rticlc5927610.ecc; Karen Frcifeld, C(omo Sqys Ha/" of AIG's Bonus Money Alay Be Returned,
BLOOC3ERG, Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-20601103
&sid-autaU6/hD3ms. Returning bonuses in this context would not fall into the
category of "voluntar'" relinquishment. General outrage over bonuses, however, is
arguably part of the penumbra we are discussing.
4:333 (2009)
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the analysis to the important case of executive compensation. Our
Conclusion follows.
I. BETWEEN CARE AND LOYALTY
Delaware law traditionally recognized two fiduciary duties: the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty. It became clear, however, that these two duties
as classically formulated were not enough-that board conduct needed to be
constrained in ways that were not reached by those two duties. Recent cases
have given prominence to a new duty, now characterized as part of the duty
of loyalty: the duty of good faith. The duty of good faith has become
increasingly important over the last several decades as a means to address
behavior that does not violate fiduciary duties as traditionally articulated, but
that is nevertheless harmful to the corporation and its shareholders. 8 This
doctrinal development, in turn, has occurred because of, and has helped to
promote, the growth of the monitoring model of boards of public
corporations. In this Part, we describe and analyze the doctrinal development
of the duty of good faith; we also discuss the economic and social
development of the monitoring board.
Traditionally, fiduciary duty analysis in corporate law had two quite
different branches. The duty of loyalty applied where a director, officer, or
controlling shareholder had a financial conflict of interest that was material
enough that it could be expected to significantly influence her decision,
creating a serious risk that this personal interest would cause her to make a
decision that was not in the best interests of the corporation. 9 A prototypical
example is a director selling property to, or buying property from, the
corporation.
Where a conflict of interest exists, courts will scrutinize the relevant
corporate decision closely. The defendants will need to show that a
conflicted transaction was nonetheless justified. They can do so in one of
three ways."' First, the defendants may try to show that disinterested and
independent directors approved the transaction. If they attempt to make
such a showing, courts will look somewhat closely at whether the directors
8. For our purposcs, we do not need to resolve thc difficult question of whcthcr fiduciary
dutics arc owcd "to the corporation" or "to sharcholdcrs."
9. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993).
10. See L)F. CODV ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2009). We discuss L)elaware's approach to conflicted




were in fact disinterested and independent, particularly where there is a
controlling shareholder, and whether those directors exercised sound business
judgment in approving the transaction.1 Second, the defendants may try to
show that a majority of the disinterested shareholders approved the
transaction. Here, courts will look somewhat closely to affirm that the
shareholders were disinterested and that they were informed of all material
facts before approving the transaction. 12 Third, the defendants may try to
show that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation. This involves
showing both that the transaction was substantively fair and also that the
procedure followed in approving the transaction was fair. 13
Many have argued that this framework makes it too easy to justify
conflicted transactions. 14 Yet once a plaintiff has succeeded in showing that a
conflict of interest exists and hence that the duty of loyalty applies, at least the
plaintiff has a fighting chance. There is a non-negligible chance that the court
will decide that the transaction is not justified and either award damages or
enjoin the transaction. Corporate boards faced with a conflicted transaction
are well advised to closely follow the prescribed procedures in the case law
for achieving valid board or shareholder approval, because if they do not,
they face a serious chance that their directors will be held liable in court.
By contrast, analysis as to whether directors have violated their duty of
care is dominated by the business judgment rule, which affords considerable
deference to directors. The court presumes that "in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company."15 Traditionally, it has been extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
overcome this presumption. Indeed, when the Delaware Supreme Court
actually dared to hold defendants liable in what was labeled a duty, of care
case, Smith v. Van Gorkom,16 a shockwave swept over the world of corporate
governance. Director and officer insurance premia skyrocketed, boards faced
challenges recruiting directors, and the Delaware legislature quickly responded
with Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") section 102(b)(7), which
11. See Kahn v. ],ynch Commc'n Sys., 669 A.2d 79, 82-83 (Del. 1995).
12. See In re W heclabrator Tcchs., Inc. S'holders Lirig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1205 (Dcl. Ch. 1995).
13. See einberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,711 (Dcl. 1983).
14. See, e.g., ] awrence I.. Mitchell, Fairness and Trulst in Coiporate Law, 43 DKV, I..J. 425, 491
(1993).
15. Aronson v. ]Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
16. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Dcl. 1985).
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shields directors from personal liability for good faith violations of the duty of
care. 17
Thus, in traditional fiduciary duty analysis, the key determination was
whether the challenged transaction involved a conflict of interest. If it did,
the duty of loyalty applied, and there was at least a decent chance that the
plaintiff could prevail and the defendant could be held personally liable. If
there was no conflict of interest, the duty of care applied, and both the
business judgment rule and DGCL section 102(b)(7) (or its equivalent in
other states) made a plaintiff victory, and particularly personal liability for
directors, extremely unlikely.
Those were the two alternative modes of analysis. That is the way it was
portrayed in the casebooks. The structures of the Model Business
Corporation Act18 and the ALI Principles of Governance 19 both reflected
these two main branches. That is the way we taught our students corporate
law.
But things have gotten more complicated over the last couple of decades.
The biggest complications occurred in the area of corporate changes of
control-friendly and hostile takeovers. Intermediate standards that did not
neatly fit within either traditional loyalty or care began to appear. The Unocal
standard applied where boards took actions to defend against potential
unwanted changes of control.2°1 The Rev/on standard applied where boards
initiated certain types of sale of control. 21
Other intermediate standards of review emerged in other contexts as well.
The Zapata standard applied where a special litigation committee
recommended dismissing a shareholder derivative suit in a case where the
demand requirement was excused. 22 The B/asius standard applied to board
actions taken with the primary purpose of frustrating the shareholder
franchise. 23
More recently, the Delaware courts began systematically developing the
good faith doctrine. Action that is in bad faith is not protected by the
17. l)E. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009).
18. MODEL Bus. CORP. AT ch. 8, subchs. (C, 1 (2002).
19. A\RiLMAN LW\\ INS1TUIE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORA'E (OVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOI\\LNDXIIONS Parts IV & V (1994).
20. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum (Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (1Del. 1985).
21. Revlon, Inc. v. NacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
22. /apata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787-88 (1Del. 1981).
23. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 62 (Dcl. Ch. 1988).
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business judgment rule, nor can director liability be waived under DGCL
section 102(b)(7) for bad faith action. Because of these rules, plaintiffs
started making claims that board actions were in bad faith, and the Delaware
courts had to begin adjudicating those claims. Three of the leading cases so
far have been Caremark,24 Disney,25 and Stone P. Ritter.26
With Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery decided that the board
has a duty to monitor the behavior of the corporation's employees to guard
against illegal behavior. The court left the board great leeway in deciding how
to carry out this duty, but boards cannot choose not to monitor at all. It is
hard for plaintiffs to prevail in a Caremark-type case: As the court put it, "only
a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as
an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exits [sic]-will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability."27 But plaintiff success is possible.
In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court confirmed that the
Caremark duty was indeed good law in Delaware, the first time that the court
had opined on the subject. 2 More importantly and controversially, the court
declared that the requirement to act in good faith was a subset of the duty of
loyalty, not an independent duty (and not a component of the duty of care). 29
Some commentators have questioned this holding; > we defended it in our
previous article. 31
The Disnej cases provide the most systematic discussion yet of what
constitutes behavior not in good faith. The cases concerned the
compensation received by Disney second-in-command Michael Ovitz, and
whether the board violated its fiduciary duty in designing Ovitz's contract or
in allowing him to exit the company with a huge windfall after only a year on
the job-a year in which he performed quite poorly. The Chancery and
Supreme Courts developed the following general formulation:
24. In re Carcmark Int'l, Inc. Dcriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
25. Thcrc were a number of decisions in this long lasting litigation. The final Delaware
Supreme Court decision was In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006).
26. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
27. In re Carcmark, 698 A.2d at 971.
28. Stone, 911 A.2d at 365.
29. Id. at 370.
30. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 ICLA
L,. Rv. 559, 604 (2008).
31. 1Ell & McDonnell, supra note 2, at 1770.
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A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance,
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation,
where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable
positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act
in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a
conscious disregard for his duties. There may be other
examples of bad faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these
three are the most salient.32
What the Delaware judiciary-both the Chancery Court and the Supreme
Court-had to say in Disney might make the good faith doctrine seem quite
promising as a means to address structural bias. That being said, while "good
faith," even narrowly construed, is a helpful adjunct to problematic director
behavior that does not implicate the duty of loyalty as traditionally construed,
it does not have nearly the reach it needs to fully address structural bias. The
problem is in the doctrine's emphasis on intentional avoidance or conscious
disregard of duty. Is a director who is influenced by the factors discussed
above-similarity in mindset and adherence (whether consciously or not) to
the pernicious golden rule-acting with a "conscious disregard" to his duties?
Probably not. Yet, in some cases such behavior may, at the earlier stages of a
case, look enough like conscious disregard that plaintiffs are able to survive a
motion to dismiss. This happened in the first Disne' decision, allowing the
case to move forward.33 It appeared to be happening in a current sale of
control case involving Rev/on claims, Ryan v. Lyonde// Chemical Co.,34 until the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[o]nly if [directors]
knowingly and completely failed to undertake their responsibilities would they
breach their duty of loyalty."'35 It remains to be seen how the case law will
develop, but a recent article co-authored by Vice Chancellor Strine of the
Delaware Chancery Court and several leading lawyers of the Delaware bar
suggests that at least some prominent voices endorse the narrower standard
rather than the more expansive standard that Disney might have
32. In re The -Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (2006) (quoting In e The -Walt
Disney Co. Dcriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 56 (2005)).
33. In re The Walt Disney (o. Deriv. ]Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278, 286-87 (Del. Ch. 2003).
34. Ryan v. ]L)ondell Chem. Co., No. 3176-VCN, 2008 W, 2923427, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 29,
2008), rev'dsub nom., yondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
35. Lyondcll (Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 44 (Del. 2009).
4:333 (2009)
Optimal Penumbra
accommodated. 36 The Supreme Court decision in Lkyondell certainly supports
that prediction. 37
Whether good faith is interpreted narrowly or more expansively, it clearly
stands between the traditional duty of loyalty and the duty of care. In our
previous articles, we have argued that good faith, together with the other
intermediate standards, yields a continuum of judicial scrutiny between
traditional loyalty and care.3 8 In some circumstances, such as in Caremark,
courts scrutinize board behavior little more than they would under the duty of
care. In other circumstances, such as in Blasius, the judicial scrutiny is nearly
as strict as under traditional loyalty analysis. 39
Why did this explosion of intermediate standards of fiduciary duty occur
over the last few decades? It is tied to a fundamental change in the role of the
board. From the beginning of modern corporate law, the board of directors
has been nominally in charge of the corporation. All legal authority within a
corporation resides in, and flows from, its board. Shareholders are granted
very few powers, other than electing the board itself. Although the board
may, and in public corporations does, delegate its power to officers who
actually run the company, the original power to make almost all corporate
decisions has always resided in the board, with the power exercised by
officers and managers being legally derived from the board's authority. 4
However, for most of the history of the modern public corporation, the
reality has been otherwise. Corporations were dominated either by a founder
or controlling shareholder, or, later in the life of successful public
corporations, by their top officers. The controlling shareholder or top
36. Leo E. Strinc, Jr. et al., Lo'al,'s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation
Law, GEo. L.J. (forthcoming 2009), available at htp://works.bcpress.coM/lawrcnce-
harncrmcsh/36/.
37. In a new paper, Julian Velasco argues that good faith and what he calls bias or
reasonableness are actually two different paradigms of review standards. Julian Velasco,
How Maty Fiduca0 ' Duties Are There in Coiporate Law? 3 4, 11 17 (Notre Dame Legal
Studies, Paper No. 09 35, 2009), available at htp://ssrn.com/abstract-1457804. In the
past we have combined the two, and we think that older language, in cases Eke Unocal and
Zapata, very much allow for a more expansive understanding of good faith. However, the
most recent cases do seem to be narrowing considerably the understanding of good faith
in L)elaware courts.
38. Iill & McDonnel, supra note 2, at 1779 87; Hill & McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and
Structura/ Bias, supra note 3, at 850 54.
39. A recent case suggests that scrutiny afforded to Blasius-type cases may be lessening. See
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007).
40. See STEPHEN M. BA\INBRIDGE, THE NFA( CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PR c'iicE 11 12 (2008).
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officers effectively had control over who was elected to the board, with the
predictable result of boards dominated by cronies and yes-men who did not
challenge the decisions of the controlling persons.
In traditional studies of corporate governance, the board of directors
played a very limited role. For instance, Berle and Means, in the first modern
scholarly analysis of large public corporations and the separation between
ownership and control, focused mostly on top corporate managers and
officers, and not particularly on the role of directors. 41 Similarly, the leading
history of the growth of large American corporations is that of Alfred
Chandler. Yet Chandler devotes almost no attention to the role of boards. 42
The composition and function of boards used to be quite different from
what we see in the United States today. Historically, a much higher
proportion of the board was composed of inside officers or closely-connected
outsiders with crucial ties to the management, such as outside counsel and
investment bankers. The main function of the board was to provide advice
to the company's officers on major strategic decisions. A second important
function was often to help attract significant resources to the corporation. A
third function, monitoring the actions of corporate managers, was present but
much less important than it has become today.
Thus, for much of the twentieth century, the leading theory of corporate
behavior was managerialism. 43  The corporation was understood to be
dominated by its managers. There was much debate over what objectives
those managers did and should have, and over how to align their actual
objectives with the desired objectives. The board of directors was basically an
afterthought.
All that has changed in major ways over the last few decades. A series of
practical and legal reforms has strived to put into place a new model of the
board that focuses on its role as a monitor of top management. These
reforms came about in part because of widespread criticism of the
managerialist model. Since at least Berle and Means, critics of large
corporations had focused on the principal-agent problem inherent in the
corporate forn. 44 Managers, it was argued, did not have proper incentives to
41. ADOIF A. BuRl v, ,,JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE, MODET RN CORPOR\TION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
42. ALFRED D. (IIANDLER, JR., TH1E VISIBLE IIAND: TH1E MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BtSINESS (1977).
43. ROBIN M\RRIS,THE 1)CONOMI( THEOR OF 'M\N\GERIl,\I' C\PIT\IISM (1964).
44. See BERIT, & ME \NS, supra note 41. The seminal modern work is Michael C. Jensen &
Wifliam II. Mcclding, Theo' of the Firm: Manageuia/ Behavio; Ageng' Costs and Ownership
4:333 (2009)
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aggressively pursue the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
Their compensation was largely inflexible, not sensitive to good or bad
corporate performance. No one had the ability and the incentive to monitor
the managers. Large companies had enough cash and little enough
competition that their managers did not need to greatly fear the consequences
of failing to fervently promote the interests of the corporation.
As part of the new reforms, the composition of boards changed, with a
growing fraction of directors required to be independent, without significant
ties to the company aside from their roles as directors. Stock exchanges 45 and
federal securities law 46 now require a majority of independent directors either
on the board itself or on certain critical board committees. State law does not
require independent directors, but a corporate decision will typically receive
significantly less judicial scrutiny if the defendants can convince the court that
the directors making the decision were independent as defined by the
applicable regulations or as determined by a court. 47
Hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and management buyouts were also
part of the new corporate governance. Hostile takeovers replaced
incompetent or poorly-motivated managers, and the fear of such takeovers
provided needed motivation. 48 Buyouts created leaner organizations, and
their debt load forced managers to achieve results or face their creditors. 49
However, this new market for corporate control created new opportunities
and temptations for incumbent managers as well. Incumbents could fend off
hostile takeovers by using the ingenious forms of anti-takeover defenses that
came into being. LBOs presented chances for insiders to enrich themselves.
Boards played a growing role in responding to and shaping these forces. 511
New forms of executive compensation were also a big part of the new
corporate governance. Tying managerial compensation to corporate
Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976). Variants of the critique go back much further, at
least to Adam Smith. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQULIRY INTO NA\TURE \ND CAUSvs OF THE
WT-,F NTTH OF NATIONS (I dwin Cannan, ed., Methuen 1904) (1776).
45. See e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 (2009), available at
http://nyscmanual'nyse'com/L('Mools/boolmark'aspid-sx ruling nyse policymanual
_303A.00&manual-/1cm/scctions/lcm scctions/.
46. Securities Ixchange Act of 1934 § 10A (m) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (m)
(2006)).
47. See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 (Del. 1987); Kahn v. ]L)nch Commc'n
Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 80 (Del. 1995).
48. See IIcnr G. Mannc, Megers and the Market for Cooorate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcON. 110, 113
(1965).
49. See Michael C. Jensen, Ecipse of the Public Cororation, 67 HARV. BtS. RTv. 61 (1989).
50. The leading case in response to these developments was Unocal Coio. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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performance, often measured by the stock price, it was argued, would give
stronger incentives to pursue the corporation's interests. 51 Yet here, too, new
temptations arose, as executives found ways to use the new forms of
compensation to vastly increase their pay while still reducing the downside
risk to themselves if their corporation did not perform well. 52 Here, too the
importance of the board grew, as boards were responsible for devising and
overseeing executive compensation.
A growing number of activist shareholders and corporate watchdogs have
focused on the behavior of boards. Activists have created formal measures of
corporate governance that measure the extent to which boards have formally
shielded themselves from shareholder disapproval. 53 Activists scrutinize the
composition of boards for signs of directors who fit formal definitions of
independence but, in fact, are cronies of the CEO. Where executive
compensation gets egregiously excessive, especially if the company's
performance has been poor, shareholders question directors, and directors
start asking closer questions of executives.
The demands of the job of director have increased notably. The job
takes more time than it used to-boards meet more frequently, and their
meetings last longer. There are more committees, and those committees, like
the full boards, meet more frequently in longer meetings than before.
Directors are expected to do more thorough homework before a meeting
than used to be the case, reading a large packet of material before each
meeting. Directors are expected to be active participants in meetings, asking
probing questions and not settling for evasive answers. 54
Notwithstanding the new emphasis on the task of monitoring, and the
need for director independence to perform this task, cronyism and insider
domination of boards are still quite common. Formal independence often
does not mean real independence in practice. Indeed, ultimately what is
wanted is a critical mindset: directors with the ability and inclination to
critically review the decisions of managers, and the willingness to say 'no' if
warranted. This critical mindset is hard to measure or prescribe, and
correlates only very weakly with new formal definitions of director
51. See Michael (. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Peformance Pqa and Top-Managemcnt Inaentives, 98
J. POL. EcON. 225, 226 (1990).
52. See general) LUCIAN BEBCIIUK & JEssE FRIED, PAY NX71TI1OUT PERFORMIANCE: TE
UNFULFIITED PROMISE OF I XE(CUTIVF CONPENSION (2004).
53. See, e.g., RiskMetrics Group, 2009 Board Practices, http://riskmetrics.com/knowledge
/2009bp Oast visited Sept. 13, 2009).
54. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 40, at 199 200.
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independence. 55  It fits better with the more standard-like, contextual
definition of independence in Delaware law. 56 Occasionally Delaware courts
apply this definition aggressively, 5 although more often they do not, finding
boards to be independent when common sense might suggest otherwise. 58
Present-day boards' longer meetings may often mean more time with
various paid experts going over recommended checklists. The large packets
of material provided to directors may not be as closely read as they should be,
and may not be truly revealing of the state of the corporation even when read
closely. Outside directors have less access to information than insiders, and
hence may be less able to ask truly probing questions. The extensive
literature on formally independent boards has not resolved the question of
whether they lead to improvements in corporate performance; certainly, early
hopes and expectations that board independence would be an unmitigated
good have not been borne out. 5 9
We think the changes are real, even if still highly incomplete and of
disputable value. Obviously, some companies have gone much further than
others in achieving real board independence, and behavior varies enormously
among directors. Still, there have been real changes in board composition
and behavior, and in the expectations that the major corporate actors have of
the board's role. Boards are now at the center of discussions of corporate
governance, both its reality and the possibilities for its reform.
The growth of the case law discussed at the beginning of this Part is
closely and complicatedly tied to the growth of the monitoring model of the
board. The case law both reflects that new role and has also helped to define
and promote it. In the cases, courts will often point to existing best practices
and either praise boards for following those practices or scold them for failing
55. Claire A. Hill & F'rin Ann O'Hara, A Cogltive Theyo of Trnlt, 84 W\SH U. ]L.R. 1717,
1781-85 (2007).
56. "The primar basis upon which a director's independence must be measured is whether
the director's decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board,
rather than extraneous considerations or influences." Beam ex re/. Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004). For more discussion on
this point, see Hill & McDonnell, L)isney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, supra note 3, at
nn.137-39 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937 48 (Dcl. Ch. 2003).
58. See, e.g., Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1051 55; In re Y-\alt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 731 A.2d 342,
354-57 (Del. Ch. 1998), afd in part, rev'd in part sub nor., Brehm v. IFisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000).
59. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independnce and
Long Term Tm Peifrmance, 27J. Cor'. L. 231, 234-37 (2002).
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to do so. Thus, existing practice influences the law, and the cases help
publicize, extol, and encourage existing best practices.
Delaware case law has helped bring this monitoring model of the board
into being.61 The old, simple two-branch model made a good deal of sense in
the days of weak boards which focused mainly on providing strategic advice.
Being in a position of formal power within a large public corporation
necessarily may provide temptations to steal resources from the company,
and courts can help by policing out-and-out theft. The traditional duty of
loyalty did that. Beyond avoiding theft, directors were not expected to do
much besides give advice. Where a decision did not involve a material
conflict of interest, it did not present a strong temptation to go against the
interests of shareholders. There was, of course, some temptation to not work
very hard-even less hard than was traditionally expected of directors-but
there was not a lot the law could effectively do about that, as was recognized
with the weak duty of care and the business judgment rule.
The growth of the monitoring model of the board has complicated
matters for directors. They are now expected to closely monitor the actions
of corporate officers and ensure that they are effectively pursuing the interests
of the corporation. There are good reasons to believe directors may not be
fully inclined to carry out these new duties. For one, boards are typically self-
reproducing, with shareholders rarely having a say in who the nominees are. 61
The natural tendency has been for the CEO to dominate the process,
resulting in directors who are highly sympathetic to the top officers. A
different problem is what we have called the pernicious golden rule. Board
directors themselves are often senior officers in other corporations. They
therefore naturally tend to prefer practices which favor senior corporate
officers. 62 For some set of decisions the board makes, self-interest is more
directly at stake, as those decisions affect who will be in control of future
boards and hence the likelihood of current directors retaining their
60. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 40, at 172 76.
61. ill & McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Strwctural Bias, supra note 3, at 853. If some
version of the SIC's current proxy access proposal eventually passes, this will give
shareholders more ability to nominate director candidates. Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 33-9046, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024
(proposed June 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rucs/proposed/2009/33
9046.pdf
62. Hill & McDonnell, Disney, GoodFaith, and St tra!BBas, supra note 3, at 853; see also Jones
v. Harris Assocs., ]L.., 537 1.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) ("L)irectors are often Ci A )s of other companies and naturally
think that CEOs should be well paid. And often they are picked by the CEO.").
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positions.6 3 The term commonly used by the courts and commentators to
describe these factors is "structural bias." 6 4
When it was not an important function of boards to monitor, structural
bias was not particularly harmful. The harm arises because structural bias is,
by its nature, antithetical to monitoring. The bias is in favor of the officers-
precisely those who are supposed to be critically monitored. In our earlier
articles we considered structural bias and showed how the factual
circumstances typically surrounding good faith cases and various forms of
intermediate scrutiny all tend to involve at least some degree of structural
bias. 65  Thus, the growth of cases applying intermediate scrutiny-higher
scrutiny than that applied in care cases, but lower than that applied in
traditional loyalty cases-addresses the structural bias problems that have
become more objectionable with the growth of the monitoring board.
II. WHY A PENUMBRA Is NEEDED
The traditional fiduciary duties capture and seek to address the obvious
ways agents might misbehave. An agent might take less care and attention as
to her principal's business than she would as to her own business. An agent
might help herself to her principal's property, or use information about the
principal to personally compete. Thus, we have the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty. The courts are anxious not to micromanage corporations; where
there is no taint arising from a loyalty conflict, 66 the doctrine provides,
appropriately, for considerable deference, once acceptable procedures have
been followed. Where there is such a taint, the courts closely scrutinize
director conduct. And, as we have discussed in the previous Part and in
earlier work, there are some types of cases where courts do more than defer
and less than closely scrutinize, including cases involving takeovers,
interference with the shareholder franchise, and some board decisions to
terminate derivative suits. Cases implicating the duty of good faith also yield
intermediate scrutiny.
63. Hill & Mclonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and StructuralBia, sp ra note 3, at 853.
64. See supra note 2; see also Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82
\ j si. U.L.Q. 8921 (2004).
65. Hill & Mcl)onnell, supra note 2, at 1792-94.
66. For ease of exposition, this formulation glosses over the duty of loyalty violation inherent
even in duty of care breaches: that the agent is taking more leisure than she is entitled to,
at the expense of her principal.
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But this has not been enough to make agents act optimally, with due
regard for their principal. One need only consider executive compensation,
discussed in Part VI. Acceptable procedures are indeed followed: due
deliberation, after sufficient review of relevant materials prepared by outsiders
with expertise and (nominal) independence. There is no conflict as that term
is traditionally defined: people are not setting their own compensation, or the
compensation of those with whom they have relationships the law would
recognize as yielding a conflict. Nor are the decision makers acting in bad
faith, as that term has thus far been defined. Still, it is hard to view executive
compensation as a decision made by critically-minded people whose only duty
is to their principal, the company (and its shareholders). There are countless
examples of stratospheric pay awarded for poor or even disastrous
performance.6 7  The mindset behind such compensation is clear: cronies
rewarding cronies.
The general willingness of boards to defer to management decisions
regarding takeovers provides another example. Too often, management
rejects an acquirer that they do not like, and that presumably would not keep
them on were it to acquire the company, or rejects one acquirer for another
largely (if not exclusively) because the acquirer they like will give them better
terms. Boards comprised of people other than executives abiding by the
pernicious golden rule, or those beholden to the management, might be less
apt to approve such decisions. Many examples exist of deals that look like the
product of excessive board deference to management. Two notable ones
follow. The first is Rev/on,6 8 where the directors favored Forstmann Little
over Pantry Pride because Forstmann would help the directors avoid a lawsuit
by shareholders who had tendered their shares for notes based on an
assurance of the notes' value. The second is Schreiber V. Burlington Nohern,
Inc. 69 The Court sets forth the facts as follows:
On December 21, 1982, Burlington Northern, Inc.,
made a hostile tender offer for El Paso Gas Co....
Burlington proposed to purchase 25.1 million El Paso shares
at $24 per share .... El Paso management initially opposed
the takeover, but its shareholders responded favorably, fully
subscribing the offer by the December 30, 1982, deadline.
67. BBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 52.
68. Revlon, Inc., v. NacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d. 173, 175-76 (Del. 1986).
69. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
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Burlington did not accept those tendered shares; instead,
after negotiations with El Paso management, Burlington
announced on January 10, 1983, the terms of a new and
friendly takeover agreement. Pursuant to the new
agreement, Burlington undertook, inter alia, to (1) rescind the
December tender offer, (2) purchase 4,166,667 shares from
El Paso at $24 per share, (3) substitute a new tender offer for
only 21 million shares at $24 per share, (4) provide
procedural protections against a squeeze-out merger of the
remaining El Paso shareholders, and (5) recognize "golden
parachute" contracts between El Paso and four of its senior
officers. By February 8, more than 40 million shares were
tendered in response to Burlington's January offer, and the
takeover was complete.
The rescission of the first tender offer caused a
diminished payment to those shareholders who had tendered
during the first offer. The January offer was greatly
oversubscribed and consequently those shareholders who
retendered were subject to substantial proration.70
The case was brought under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; the plaintiff claimed that the transaction violated the section's
prohibition of "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices ... in
connection with any tender offer."1' 7 The plaintiffs claim was that the offer
was "manipulative." The Court held that:
Nowhere in the legislative history is there the slightest
suggestion that 14(e) serves any purpose other than
disclosure, or that the term "manipulative" should be read as
an invitation to the courts to oversee the substantive fairness
of tender offers; the quality of any offer is a matter for the
marketplace.72
70. Id. at 2-4 (footnotes omitted).
71. Securities Fxchange Act of 1934 K 14(e) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.(. K 78n(e)
(2006)).
72. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11 12 (footnote omitted).
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The plaintiff therefore lost. No state corporate claim of breach of fiduciary
duty is reported-presumably, the plaintiff's lawyers concluded such a case
was not worth bringing.
What was happening in this case? Any sensible reading makes the
following conclusion inevitable: directors caused the acquirer to withdraw its
offer and substitute an offer less favorable to shareholders and more
favorable to management. In the first offer, shareholders could sell 25.1
million shares; in the second, they could only sell 21 million. That
shareholders wanted to sell is demonstrated by their reaction to both offers-
the first was fully subscribed, and the second one was "greatly
oversubscribed." Can anyone think a board with undivided loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders would have acted in this way?
The El Paso directors could justify their actions based on the squeeze-out
protections: shareholders did get something in the new deal that they had not
gotten in the old deal. We can be sure that the directors were well advised by
counsel as to how to assure that they gave (and documented that they gave)
careful consideration to all their actions and options. We can also be sure
that there were no structural conflicts-that nobody approved his own
golden parachute. But, again, any sensible reading screams out that the
directors were favoring their own interests over those of the shareholders. It
seems likely that the new standards for breach of the duty of good faith
would not cover this situation either. While it nominally might seem to fit
within one of the categories of good faith violation described in the Disney
decision-where the director "intentionally acts with a purpose other than
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation"13-directors would
again point to the squeeze-out protections and presumably prevail.
Law, in its traditional sense, is apparently not fully able to do what the
corporation and its shareholders need it to do: make agents live up to their
fiduciary duty to act with undivided loyalty to their principals. The duty of
care does not work; it does not even serve as a source of liability given DGCL
section 102(b)(7).74 But we do not want to dismiss the role played by the duty
of care too easily: We will argue in the next Part that the words of the law
have expressive force, too, and invoke extra-legal forces such as reputation.
The duty of care, therefore, has force well beyond its ability to yield sanctions
for violations. Certainly, notwithstanding the duty's toothlessness as a source
73. hi re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re The
Walt L)isney (o. Deriv. litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
74. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, : 102(b)(7) (2009).
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of legal liability, law firms routinely advise directors to abide by their duty of
care. But that does not help much either: It is easy to game procedure,
complying in fact but not in spirit. Consider in this regard the procedures
followed, post-Van Gorkom, by boards considering a merger to show they
have abided by their duty of care, including most notably the acquisition of a
(costly) fairness opinion (and the careful documenting by (costly) lawyers of
the decision-making process). Many scholars think the main beneficiaries of
this "duty" are investment bankers and lawyers, not the corporation or its
shareholders.7s The duty of loyalty does not work either, given that breaches
are defined so narrowly. What about the expansion via the duty of good faith
and the broader penumbra of the now enlarged duty of loyalty concept? As
we argued above, the duty of good faith has thus far been construed
narrowly, to require intentional conduct (or misconduct).
Moreover, as to all the fiduciary duties, the force of doctrine will
necessarily be limited where we cannot set forth ex ante procedures or
outcomes we want to require or prohibit. We do not want judges to
micromanage corporate decision making, and we do not want corporate
actors to be too susceptible to a court's attempt to glean norms of the "you
know it when you see it" variety. The specter of structural bias is ubiquitous
enough, and the decisions are complex enough, requiring good business
judgment, that close judicial scrutiny as employed in traditional loyalty analysis
seems ill-advised. Business persons, not judges, have the best experience to
make business decisions, and courts risk undermining the fundamental
distribution of authority to boards if they intervene too frequently or too
intricately in board decisions.76 Yet, market forces on their own, though
constraining, seem to fall short of encouraging a critical mindset. This leaves
open the door for a role for the law in helping to shape behavior using forces
other than the credible threat of legal liability. Others have remarked upon
and discussed this distinction between legal standards that lead to liability and
legal standards that may influence behavior but do not lead to liability. We
discuss their work in the next Part, and build on it and extend it in several
ways in the remainder of this Article.
75. See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 55, at 1789-90.
76. BAINBMIDGE, Supra note 40, at 120 26.
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III. COMMENTARY ON THE PENUMBRA
Delaware judges have themselves commented on their norm-setting role,
although they do not always use the term "norm." An interesting recent
example is Delaware's Guidance: Ensuring Equit for the Modern Witenagemot,
written by Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron Steele (co-written
with J.W. Verret).77 This Article surveys three sorts of extra-judicial activities
by Delaware judges: speeches and articles, dicta, and membership in formal
policymaking bodies such as ABA committees.7S Steele and Verret focus on
the guidance function that these activities perform. They argue that for good
reasons, corporate fiduciar duty law has a good deal of indeterminacy.
Fiduciary duties "rise and fall with the tides of human conscience" and set
expectations that must apply to evolving business circumstances.79 However,
this indeterminacy creates costs due to the uncertainty it creates for business
planning. The extra-judicial activities they discuss help reduce uncertainty
while still giving courts flexibility to apply evolving standards.
In another recent article, former Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey focuses
on the role of judges in shaping best practices in corporate governance. 8 Of
particular note is Veasey's analysis of the importance of procedural posture. 81
Many important statements concerning frowned-upon behavior occur in
motions to dismiss, based sometimes on extreme allegations of misbehavior,
before defendants have had a chance to disprove bad facts or prove good
ones. Ultimately, these defendants are usually not held liable. Yet as Veasey
says, "an opinion that raises questions or teaches without imposing liability
may provide guidance to the corporate world to conform to best practices
without the downside of actually imposing personal liability. '"82
Shortly after stepping down as a Chancer) Court judge, William Allen
wrote an article explicitly noting the role of Delaware decisions in shaping
77. Myron T. Steele & J. W. Verret, Delaware's Guidance: Ensuring Equity for the Modern
Witenagemot, 2 V,\. L. & Bus. Rv. 189 (2007).
78. Id. at 192.
79. Id. at 194.
80. E. Norman Vcascv & Christinc T. Di Guglielmo, hat Happened in Delaware Corporate Law
and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospcive on Some Ky Developments, 153 U. I',\. 1,. Ruv.
1399, 1404 (2005).




norms. 83 In the article, Allen recognizes Melvin Eisenberg's distinction
between standards of conduct and standards of review, and asks what point
might be served by having judicial decisions that denounce bad conduct
without imposing liability. His answer is that the law is in part "an expression q1
communit ideals designed to inspire solidarity around certain values." 84 This
works because most officers and directors are not Holmesian bad men, but
rather persons who conform to norms because of "their own sense of moral
worth." 85
Several legal scholars have made crucial contributions to understanding
the norm-setting function of the Delaware courts. One such contribution is
Melvin Eisenberg's distinction, referred to above, between standards of
conduct and standards of review.86 In his terminology, a standard of conduct
"states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role,"
while a standard of review "states the test a court should apply when it
reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether to impose liability or grant
injunctive relief."87 Eisenberg notes that standards of conduct serve "as a
foundation for private standards of conduct,"88 a point that is central to our
analysis. He notes that this message is sometimes sent through legal advice
by lawyers advising clients, and sometimes by corporate codes of conduct. 89
Eisenberg discusses several justifications for the divergence between
standards of conduct and standards of review. One is that the courts want to
give two messages to directors and officers: they must act with due care, but
we (the courts) will give them "running room" so they are not too risk
averse. 91  A second justification is that the courts want to tell directors and
officers to act with due care, but they also want to be fair and account for the
difficulty courts have in determining whether decisions are reasonable. 91 As
for the duty of loyalty, one justification for the distinction is that courts are
83. Wliam T. Allen, The Coiporate Director's Fiduca 0 ' Dub' of Care aund the Business Judgment Rule
Under U.S. Coiporate Law, in COMIPRATIVL CORPORAiE (OVERNANCE: THE SiATE OFL
111E Ak AND E\IER(IN(, REsEARcii 307 (K.J. Ilopt et al. eds., 1998).
84. Id. at 329 (emphasis in original).
85. Id.
86. Melvin Aron I isenberg, The Divergnce of Standards of Condm/ and Standards of Review in
Colorate Lax, 62 FORdIiAiXMI L. Ruv. 437 (1993).
87. Id. at 437.
88. Id at 464.
89. Id
90. Id at 465.
91. Id.
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sending different messages to different actors. 92 To primary actors (officers,
mainly), the courts' message is that they should act with due care and regard
for corporate interests. To corporate reviewing organs (the board, mainly),
the courts' message is that they should review the conduct of the officers
according to the standard of conduct established under the duty of loyalty,
and exercise due care in reviewing that conduct, knowing that approval will
protect that conduct from liability if it meets the relevant standard of
review.93 A final justification for the conduct/review divergence is that
standards of conduct are directed at primary actors, who often act without
detailed legal advice and need simple principles, while standards of review are
directed at courts and boards, bodies that know the law or are advised by
lawyers who do, and thus such standards can be more complex and
legalistic. 94
The previous articles that probably come closest to our analysis of the
norm-setting function of Delaware courts are by Edward Rock, sometimes on
his own, 95 and sometimes with Michael Wachter. 96 In his article Saints and
Sinner, Rock argues that Delaware law operates largely through "sermons" '97
or "morality play[s]." 91 These sermons occur in Delaware cases, but also in
speeches and papers by Delaware judges. 99 Rock hypothesizes that the
messages of the sermons are transmitted to corporate directors and officers in
good part through the advice of corporate counsel.1 0 These sermons work
by shaming bad actors and by helping to set corporate norms. Norms, in
turn, matter because the world of officers and directors of large U.S.
corporations is a "surprisingly small and close-knit community" where norms
and shaming can have a powerful effect. M
That, then, is a brief picture of the relevant legal landscape, how it has
evolved, and how that legal evolution has occurred along with, and tied to, a
change in the composition and expected behavior of boards of directors. We
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 466.
95. 1'Fdward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Coiporate Law Work?, 44 UCA 1L.
Rnv. 1009 (1997).
96. 1'Fdward B. Rock & Michael ]L. Wachter, Islands of Conscous Power Law, Norms, and tMe Sef-
Governing Cotporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619 (2001).
97. Rock, supra note 95, at 1016.
98. Id. at 1047.
99. Id. at 1068-70.
100. Id. at 1070-72.
101. Id. at 1013 14.
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also have seen how other scholars have analyzed the distinction between
standards of conduct and standards of review, in Eisenberg's terms. These
commentators sometimes use different terminology-norms, standards of
conduct, shaming-but they all address what we call "the penumbra of
Delaware corporate law," the part of "law" beyond law on the books and as
enforced by judges that nevertheless influences the behavior of corporate
actors, especially directors and officers. In the next Part, we explain what the
penumbra of Delaware law consists of, and how it works.
IV. THE PENUMBRA OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
What is in the penumbra? As discussed briefly in the previous Part, the
penumbra includes pronouncements by Delaware judges other than their
opinions. Some Delaware corporate law judges are quite active in the
corporate governance debate: they write articles, give interviews to the media,
or speak at legal conferences. Moreover, even within the courtroom, the
judges express their views in a manner intended to influence behavior
through norms, rather than the sanctioning power of law. Consider in this
regard Vice Chancellor Strine's comment at the beginning of this Article.
Consider as well language in another Chancery Court case:
[I]he settlement in the Court's opinion leaves much to be
desired.
The Court's role in reviewing the proposed Settlement,
however, is quite restricted. If the Court was a stockholder
of Occidental it might vote for new directors, if it was on the
Board it might vote for new management and if it was a
member of the Special Committee it might vote against the
Museum project. But its options are limited .... 102
The court is telling the defendants that it does not think highly of their
conduct, but that it does not have the power to sanction them. Presumably,
the court is not just venting-it is hoping to influence behavior.
The penumbra also includes advice given by the corporations' law firms.
Firms give specific advice for specific situations, and they frequently write
memos (often posted on their websites as advertisements for their services),
102. Sullivan v. Hammer, No. 10823, 1990 WI, 114223, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990), itedin
Iill & McDonnell, supra note 2, at 1795 n.130.
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summarizing and explaining the latest cases and developments, including
pronouncements by Delaware judges.1 3  In this regard, advice-giving
corporate counsel are a ubiquitous part of life in a large, modern corporation.
These lawyers are a central mechanism by which the norms and expectations
of Delaware judges are conveyed to officers and directors.
Additionally, the penumbra includes some of the more influential views
in the corporate governance debate. In this regard, consider the enormous
wealth of materials online that include "best practices" and other
recommendations for corporate actors. One prominent voice is that of
CalPERS, the California public pension fund; CalPERS is also a plaintiff in
many shareholder suits, as are several other pension funds. CalPERS hosts a
corporate governance website that describes at great length CalPERS'
philosophy about how corporations should be run, and discusses the actions
CalPERS is taking to get corporations to do its bidding.0 4 Two other major
corporate governance websites are www.corpgov.net and
www.thecorporatelibrary.com. Another influential (and quite controversial)
source of "corporate law" on this view is RiskMetrics Group (formerly
Institutional Shareholder Services). 5 Directors who do not vote in a manner
viewed favorably by RiskMetrics risk losing their seats, since many
shareholders follow RiskMetrics' voting recommendations.
Much of this "law" has a distinctly pro-shareholder bias, 1 6 but not all.
Memos from the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, one of the
103. See, e.g., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton ]L,1, http://www.cgsh.com/
News/Search.aspx (follow "PUBI( ATIONS: More" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 12,
2009); Debevoise & Plimpton ]LI,1, http://www.debevoise.com/newseventspubs
/publications/ last visited Sept. 12, 2009); Dewey & LcBoeuf LLP,
http://www.dcweylcboeuf com/en/Idcas.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2009); Fricd, Frank,
Harris, Shrivcr & Jacobson LLP, http://www.fffhsj.com/index.cfm?pagclD-7 (last visitcd
Sept. 12, 2009); Mayer-Brown IT ,, http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications
/index.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2009); Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom l,,P,
http://www.skaddcn.com/Index.cfm?contcntID-6 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009); Sullivan
& Cromwell LLP, http://www.sullcrom.com/publications/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2009);
'N ilkic Farr & Gallagher LLP, http://www.willlic.com/firm/pubs.aspx (last visited Sept.
12, 2009).
104. CalP] RS, Corporate Governance, http://www.calpers-governance.org/ (last visited Sept.
12, 2009). There are many other influential corporate governance blogs. See, e.g., Harvard
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
http://blogs.law.harvard.cdu/corpgov/last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
105. RiskMetrics Group, http://www.riskmetrics.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
106. The www.corpgov.net home page begins as follows: "Since 1995 the Corporate
Governance website at CorpGov.net has facilitated the ability of institutional and
individual sharcowners to better govern corporations, enhancing both corporate
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world's top corporate law firms, emphasize the benefits of managerial power
and discretion.') Some recent articles and dicta do so as well, such as Vice
Chancellor Strine's arguments on the common interests of management and
labor,l"S as well as a recent decision in which he favored deference to
management. 119
Part of "corporate law" also involves the proxy process. Law governs
which shareholder proxy proposals are included in management's proxy
statements."(h It does not, however, govern whether management must adopt
a proposal that is only precator}, as most shareholder proposals are. Law in
its pure form-as a possible source of liability if its dictates are not
followed has a very limited reach. Its penumbra is far broader, and much of
what directors do when they make efforts to comply with "the law" reaches
far into that penumbra. The penumbra is thus an important influence on
corporate director behavior.
How does the penumbra work? A good starting point for our discussion
is an observation about Delaware corporate law, a bit less true today than
when first made, but still carrying considerable force: that directors are more
likely to be struck by lightning than to be found liable for breaching their
fiduciary duty.111 Indeed, when we teach fiduciary duty concepts, but explain
that directors almost certainly will not be paying out-of-pocket for violations
of duties given possibilities for exculpation under DGCL section 102(b)(7),
indemnification, or insurance, astute students sometimes ask: What's left?
accountability and the creation of wealth." Corporate Governance,
http://www.corpgov.net (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
107. See, e.g., David A. Katz & ]Laura A. Mclntosh, Cororate Governance Updac: Populis/s' Wish
Lists Offer Legislative Parade of Hoibles, July 23, 2009,
htp://blogs.law.harvard.cdu/corpgov/filcs/2009/07/popuists wish ists offer lcgislative
parade of horribls.pdf; Martin Lipton et al., A Crisis is a Tenible Thing to Waste: The
Proposed 'Shareholder Bil of Rights Act of 2009" Is a Serious Mistake, May 12, 2009, http://
wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew , /W,RKMemos/W],RK/Wl,RKIM.16657.09.pdf, Posting of
Martin Lipton, Coiporate Governance in Crisis Times, to The Harvard Law School Forum on
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.cdu/corpgov
/2009 /07 /20/ corporate governancc in crisis times/ (July 30, 2009, 9:29 ES'I).
108. Leo Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of
Alanagcrs and Labor in a More Rational Sjstem of Cororate Governance, 33 J. CORP. ]L. 1, 3
(2007).
109. Mercier v. Inter Tl (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007).
110. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a 8 (2009).
111. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. ]L. RmvV. 1055, 1139-40 (2006);
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trps/worhincss, and the Behavioral Foundations of
Cotporate Law, 149 U. %. ]L. Ruv. 1735, 1791 (2001), ited in Hill & McDonnell, siipra note
2, at 1772 n.15.
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What does it mean to have a duty that you can violate without at least
monetary sanction?
The answer is, of course, that what corporate law is considered to require,
or the ways in which parties subject to corporate law comply with the law, is
not coextensive with what parties can be punished for violating. What we
teach as "corporate law," and what we regard to be "corporate law," includes
a considerable penumbra, including as it does "duties" the violation of which
would not yield a sanction. Consider the typical law firm memo describing a
director's fiduciary duties: It goes well beyond what a director must do to
avoid liability, often spending considerable time parsing the sometimes
expansive dicta in Delaware corporate law opinions.
A typical example of such a memo advising compliance with the law's
penumbra is an analysis in Health Lawyers Week9' of a recent bankruptcy case
involving Caremark duties for corporate officers. 112  The case, Miller v.
McDonald,113 involved a bankruptcy trustee's complaint alleging breach of
fiduciary duty against corporate officers, including the general counsel. The
Delaware bankruptcy court held that Caremark duties apply to corporate
officers, including the general counsel, and that the general counsel could
potentially be held liable for aiding and abetting violations of fiduciary duty. 114
The court denied a motion to dismiss; the defendants were thus still far from
actually being held liable.
The memo, written by a lawyer at McDermott Will & Emery, describes
the facts in the case, the basic law of Caremark, and the court's decision in
Miller. It does point out that the decision only addressed the motion to
dismiss, and was not a finding of liability.115 Nonetheless it concludes that:
At its core, the case speaks to the critical value attributed
to organizational commitment to corporate compliance, i.e.,
the potential that effective compliance systems possess to
safeguard against wrongdoing by corporate officers,
employees or agents. The board should respond to this
decision with a renewed interest in providing effective
compliance plan oversight.
112. Michael WV. Pcregrinc, Carcmark Duties Ascribed to Gcncral Counsel, Other Officers, 6
Health Law. W\Xldv. 23 June 13, 2008), available at http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs
/peregrine06l608.pdf.
113. Miller v. McDonald, 385 B.R. 576 (Bankr. 1). Del. 2008).
114. Id. at 591-93.
115. Pcrcgrine, supra note 112, at 2.
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The court's refusal to dismiss the corporate
waste/"aiding and abetting" allegations underscore [sic] the
need for corporate leadership to be increasingly sensitive to
the significant burdens being placed upon general counsel by
legislation, regulation, and judicial decisions. This is
critical. 116
Thus, what is "required" or indeed routinely done on account of what is
in the penumbra, is not the same as what is required and routinely done under
law. Clearly directors do not simply "abide by" what is in the penumbra.
That being said, it does influence their behavior in important ways. Judicial
pronouncements and law firm memos are probably most closely adhered to.
Beyond that, different directors and corporations will respond differently to
other extra-legal forces. Some companies might still ignore precator3
proposals passed with a large majority of the vote, but that is becoming
increasingly less common. 117 Some directors are far more influenced than
others to vote in a manner approved by RiskMetrics. Some companies are
more influenced than others to comply with the best practices specified by
RiskMetrics or CalPERS or other organizations formulating and publicizing
their views. Some are more influenced than others by demands of activist
shareholders like Carl Icahn, a "reformed" corporate raider who has
reinvented himself as a champion for shareholder rights. 118 Indeed, Icahn
influenced Yahoo! to replace some of its board members with directors he
116. Id. at 3.
117. Yonca Ertimur et al., Board of Directors' Responsiveness to Shareholders.- Evidence from Shareholder
Proposals, (Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-048, 2008), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-048.pdf. The abstract notes that: "The frequency
of implementation [of shareholder resolutions] has almost doubled after 2002, reaching
more than 40%. Shareholder pressure (e.g. the voting outcome and the influence of the
proponent) and the type of proposals are the main determinants of the implementation
decision, while traditional governance indicators do not seem to matter. Outside directors
implementing MV [majority vote] shareholder proposals experience a one-fifth reduction
in the likelihood of losing their board seat and in the likelihood of losing other
directorships."
118. See lhc Icahn Report, http://www.icahnreport.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). For an
argument that Icahn is actually advancing his own interests to the detriment of
shareholders, see I.)nn A. Stout, Op-l Id., Wh, Carl Icahn Is Bad for Investors, WANTL ST. ,
Aug. 1, 2008, at All, available at http: online.wsj.com/ article/ SB1217 54688222
002635.html.
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designated. 119 He also prevailed in his proxy fight at Amylin Pharmaceuticals,
getting elected to the board and ousting the CEO. 120 His letter to the
Chairman of the Board began:
Amylin is a prime example of what is wrong with the
corporate governance of most American public companies.
We agree with you that the board of Amylin should
change. However, three major stockholders of Amylin,
namely Eastbourne, ourselves and, significantly, Ted Greene
- Amylin's co-founder, all agree that the obvious choice for
the first director to leave Amylin's board is you. 121
Especially given his recent successes, directors may want to appease Icahn to
avoid being targeted by him for removal.
Why do directors do more than the law requires? First, they want some
margin of safety beyond just avoiding liability. 122 They would also like, of
course, to minimize the chance they will even be sued: Coming "close to the
line" is generally not the applicable ethos, except perhaps in contentious
takeover battles or for a director valuing a reputation as aggressive. Thus, to
some extent the penumbra acts as a sort of safe harbor. By engaging in the
kind of best practices praised by Delaware judges, even though doing so is
not required, officers and directors reduce to nearly zero the already
extremely small chances of legal liability. This accounts for why they pay
close attention to what their companies' law firm memos advise; it accounts
as well for their acting in accordance with the non-binding pronouncements
of the Delaware judiciary. To some extent, agency costs are implicated. At
times, firms might benefit from more aggressive behavior by their directors
119. Peter Kafka, Yahoo, Icahn Settle: Carl Gets Three Seats, Ends Proxy Fight, July 21, 2008,
http: //finance.'ahoo.com/tech-ticker/article/ 41020/Yahoo Icahn-Settle-Car-Gets-Thre
e Scats Ends Proxy Fight.
120. See In Victo' for Icahn, A)/ni Chaman is Ousted, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009,
http://dcalbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/in victory for icahn amylin chairman is
-ousted/.
121. Letter from Carl Icahn to Joseph (C. Cook, Chairman of the Board of Amylin
Pharmaceutical, Jic., (Apr. 15, 2009), http://news.prnewswire.com/l)isplavRelease
Contcnt.aspx?(\Tl104&SIORY-/www/story/04 15 2009/0005006461&ED YI'E-.
122. Of course, all of this glosses over the role of settlement, indemnification and insurance.
S generally Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing lonitor in Coporat Governanc: The
Diretors' and Officers' Liabi/fi Insurer, 95 Geo. I..J. 1795 (2007); Tom Baker & Sean J.
Griffith, Predicting Cororate Governance Risk: Ev/dcnce from the Directors' and Offcers' Liability
InsuranceAlarket, 74 U. (iii. L. REv. 487 (2007).
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and less spending on law firms advising on the law and penumbra. But
directors have the ability to spend firm money on something that benefits
them without regard to whether it benefits the firm, and so they do.
What about the remainder of the penumbra? Why adopt a precatory
shareholder proposal that has passed with a majority of votes? Why adopt
such a proposal when it has gotten a respectable percentage, but less than a
majority of the votes? Why follow CalPERS' best practices? One obvious
answer is fear that a proxy contest will be mounted to replace the directors if
they do not do what seems to be the shareholders' bidding. Another is that
to the extent a norm arises to abide by a particular practice, directors will
suffer reputational costs if they do not abide by it. Here we start to see a dark
side to the penumbra, a point to which we will return shortly.
A related explanation for obedience to widely-recognized social norms is
that that is what people often do: they follow norms. 123 Norms become
internalized, and hence are followed independent of the possibility of
sanctions for violation. If the norm is murky, or if the benefits from violating
it are high enough, people will stray. But as long as the norm's directives are
fairly clear, and following the norm is not too inconsistent with one's self-
interest, many, if not most people will abide by it. This is particularly true to
the extent that the world of large corporate officers and directors is a
relatively small and close-knit community, as described by Rock.124 In such
communities, it is hard to tell where reputation and social sanctions stop and
norm internalization begins.
Pronouncements by Delaware judges play an important role in these
reputational and norm-following mechanisms. For the mechanisms to work,
there must be fairly well-understood and widely agreed-upon rules for what
directors should do in performing their jobs. In a complicated and always-
changing business world, it will often be unclear what norms of good
behavior require. It is extremely helpful to have a central source that most
actors in the system accept as a respected and accurate arbiter of good
behavior. Delaware judges play that role well enough and, we would argue,
better than any other plausible actor in the relevant sphere.
One should also ask where Delaware judges obtain their understanding of
what is required of well-behaved corporate boards. One important source is
their observation of best practices in well-respected, well-run public
123. See Allen, supra note 83, at 329; see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law
andEconomics, 50 STAN. ],. RFvv. 1471, 1496-97 (1998).
124. Rock, supra note 95, at 1013 14.
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corporations. Thus we see a feedback loop. New best practices emerge in
leading companies. Delaware judges point to those practices in scolding
parties before them from less-well-run companies. Through the various
communication mechanisms discussed above, these judicial pronouncements
are spread to the directors of other boards, and the new practices become
more widespread. As a particular practice becomes more and more
entrenched, failing to follow it leaves a company increasingly open to
criticism should it wind up in court, thereby increasing the incentives to adopt
the practice.
How effective the penumbral mechanisms we discuss here really are
remains an open empirical question, one unlikely to be resolved any time
soon. How would we measure the effects in isolation? Thus, we cannot
know how valuable the penumbra is, nor can we even prove that it is valuable
at all. We certainly can see considerable room for improvement. The current
financial crisis, like the ones before it, clearly shows that great holes remain in
our corporate governance system, despite the penumbra. We do think,
however, that even absent proof, the available evidence suggests that the
penumbra does serve as a valuable constraint on directors, and without it,
things would likely be even worse. Consider fields in which it is arguably the
case that abiding by the letter of the law, while perhaps violating the spirit, is
deemed acceptable, such as corporate tax compliance. Corporations and their
officers and directors are excellently situated to get expensive advice to help
them do precisely what law on the books and as enforced requires. The
immediate response to Van Gorkom-a full employment act for lawyers and
investment bankers with only minimal substantive benefit to the corporation
and its shareholders-shows how corporate law without a penumbra might
operate. Some directors follow just the letter of the law, and some also
follow its spirit (and some follow neither). Many directors follow the letter
and spirit in some circumstances and merely the letter in others. A key
method for improving corporate governance is to expand the domain in
which directors actively abide by the norms of good conduct enunciated in
the penumbra-essentially, the law's spirit-and to contract the domain in
which directors merely do what they must to avoid legal liability.
V. THE DARK SIDE OF THE PENUMBRA
We do not mean to depict the penumbra in unambiguously positive
terms. The penumbra has a dark side as well. The penumbra effectively
consists of norms. Two norms-fueled approaches to corporate governance,
one a matter of substance and one a matter of procedure, are vulnerable to
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the charge that they have become influential through a process that does not
give full weight to appropriate competing interests. One such approach is the
shareholder primacy norm that gives shareholders ever-increasing powers. 125
The other is the checklist approach to corporate governance, wherein some
checklist of best practices is advanced as desirable, without sufficient
evidence, and there is punishment, in the form of reputation loss and perhaps
loss of jobs for directors, for not abiding by the checklist. As between
shareholders and directors and, for that matter, as between shareholders and
other constituencies, the appropriate division of powers is very much an open
issue.1 26 The checklist approach, typically advancing changes in the name of
shareholder primacy, is open to criticism on that ground and on grounds that
nobody knows whether what it promotes is a good idea, even for advancing
shareholder interests or for advancing the corporation's interests. These
criticisms are often, and vociferously, made. 127
Why do they not carry the day? How can we argue that extra-legal forces
should have even more power than they do, given the perils we have
described? We have two main arguments in response. One is that, of course,
the trajectory of the law proceeds not only through pressure on traditional
law-making bodies, but also through its effects on, and the consequent
reactions of, other affected parties. That is, a penumbra is inevitable, be it
optimal or not; what we propose to a large extent is something that would
happen even if courts did not consciously encourage it. When a company is
sued to force it to include a shareholder proposal on its management proxy
statement, and allows the proposal rather than proceeding with the suit, we
think that certainly in the short term, that is an acceptable way to proceed.
Much more importantly, whomever the principal is-the corporation, at
least, but perhaps also the shareholders-it is clear who the principal is not.
the company board and management. It is also clear that structural bias has
run amuck, yielding boards that defer too much to management, where
management has too great a sense of entitlement. The traditional duties of
125. See Lucian Agc Bcbchuk, The Case for Intreasing Shareholder Power, 118 II1RV. L. Ruv. 833
(2005).
126. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Emplqyee Prima'y, or Economics Meets Civic Repub/ican/sm at
Work, 13 ST\N. J.l. Bus. & IIN. 334 (2007); Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbr/dg and
the Artovian Moment, 34 DE. J. CORP. L. 139 (2009).
127. See, e.g., Jeffrcy Sonncnfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading AMths ofBad Vetrics, 18 ACAD.
McGvT. 1RSP. 108 (2004); see a/so Robert 1Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good are
Commenal Governance Ratings? (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ.,
Working Paper No. 1), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/displav/images/dvnamic
/publicationspdf/dgl6 26 2008_l.pdf; 1II & O'IHara, supra note 55, at 1785 n.289.
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care and loyalty are the easy ones to specify and articulate, at least
comparatively speaking. It is the vast middle ground-the difference between
what the director does and what a truly critically-minded director would do-
that is hard. Depending on who we think the principals are, we may have
different views on what the directors should do. But we know what they
should not do: pay themselves massive "bonus" compensation for indifferent
or poor results, consider or reject corporate combinations to build themselves
empires or to keep their jobs, etc. The law in its narrow, non-expressive
sense is not equipped to make substance-based decisions on these points. We
need therefore to marshal extra-legal forces-the specter of scrutiny, the
holding up of cronyistic decision-making as such, and so on. Strine, in the
introductory quote, does just that. He evocatively shames the company and
the directors on the special committee, confronting them viscerally regarding
their non-critical mindset, and for adopting a "going through the motions"
role, where the outcome was pre-determined. It is an apt criticism of our
argument that we like extra-legal forces when they are being marshaled for
what, in our view, is the good. But we think that agent misbehavior is a
pervasive problem that law is not equipped to address nearly as well as it
should. We think that given agents' ability to favor their own interests and act
adversely to their principals, a counterweight is needed, and that the
penumbra, while imperfect, nevertheless serves as a good and necessary
counterweight.
VI. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Executive compensation presents an excellent case for our theory. In
recent decades, the compensation of top American executives in public
corporations has soared as it has increasingly taken the form of stock options
and other sorts of equity-based instruments. This move was encouraged by
reformers who thought equity-based compensation would more closely align
the interests of executives and shareholders. Regulation encouraged the
move, particularly through the tax code. 128
The effects of this new form of compensation are fiercely disputed.
Some believe it has accomplished its goal and encouraged beneficial risk-
taking and a greater focus on shareholder value. Others believe that the
process of setting compensation in public corporations is captured by the
executives themselves, who control the board composition and who put there
128. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m) (2008).
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like-minded top executives from other corporations who have no inclination
to derail this gravy train. These critics claim that the new forms of
compensation, particularly stock options, have encouraged short-term efforts
to pump up stock prices, sometimes by out-and-out fraud. When the long-
term costs of these short-term strategies become apparent, the CEOs who
implemented them are sitting on the beach in the Bahamas.
There is heated debate between proponents of these two pictures of
executive compensation, with Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried providing the
most detailed critique of compensation practices. 129 Many have in turn
criticized Bebchuk and Fried. 13 It is hard to empirically sort out this debate,
because most compensation practices can be given some sort of efficiency-
based justification, but can also be seen in a more sinister light. It is very hard
to compare existing practice to an ideal system, in part because the
optimization problem is extremely complicated and we have few, if any,
examples of how compensation would be set in public corporations not beset
by the kind of structural bias that makes existing practices questionable. For
present purposes, we simply assert that Bebchuk and Fried have more than
held their own in this debate, and refer the reader to their responses to their
critics. 131 Of course, we enter this debate already inclined to side with them
insofar as we tend to believe that structural bias problems are widespread and
not adequately corrected by market mechanisms. We have some surprising
company in this view: Richard Posner, in a dissent to the denial of a petition
for rehearing en banc in a case charging that a mutual fund adviser's fees were
excessive, noted that "[c]ompetition in product and capital markets can't be
counted on to solve the problem because the same structure of incentives
operates on all large corporations and similar entities, including mutual
funds."132
Consider how law on the books and as enforced in courts might try to
regulate compensation. Is law going to set some dollar maximum?
Presumably not. What about mandating some sort of procedure by
"independent" directors? Been there, done that, and it has not helped. The
stock exchanges require a Compensation Committee composed of
129. BEBCHUK & l"RIED, supra note 52.
130. For an overview of the debate, see Lucian A. Bcbchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pa Without
Pejforlwance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. Con,. L. 647 (2005).
131. Id.
132. Jones v. Harris Assocs., J,.)., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579
(2009).
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independent directors, and that committee is required to produce a report on
executive officer compensation and make recommendations to the board. 133
This is the full employment act for compensation consultants, and it does
nothing to address the less- than-critical determinations made by directors too
deferential to management. Any proposed compensation amount can always
be justified through some, probably costly, process. 134
Indeed, law has historically had a difficult time regulating executive
compensation. There are early cases finding compensation excessive, but
more recent cases tend to be quite hands-off.135 So long as a non-conflicted
process is followed, compensation is rarely second guessed (at least in public
corporations), even though structural bias is clearly implicated. Directors
tend to be executive officers of other companies, so they start with the
mindset that a high-pay package is appropriate. They also benefit from
setting high executive pay packages given that their own compensation as
officers of other companies is set in part by reference to those packages. And
of course they depend on keeping officers' good favor in order to keep their
jobs.
What to do? We know what happened when the market (with the help of
the IRS) tried to take care of the problem. 136 At the time, shareholders were
complaining that managers were getting paid fixed salaries regardless of
performance. So, performance was linked to pay. But the rub was that there
is no consensus way of measuring performance. Those receiving the
compensation are in the perfect position to game the applicable performance
measures-and they do. "Performance" for compensation purposes could
have, and often had, little to do with true performance. 137 The result of
linking pay with "performance" was that executive compensation increased
exponentially-as did, in some cases, the risks taken by companies. Indeed,
the current financial crisis owes significantly to "performance" based pay, as
executives, particularly in financial service companies, were motivated to take
enormous risks to produce stellar "performance." When the "performance"
133. NYS]., Inc., Listed Company Manual, § 303A.05 (2009), available at http://nysemanual
.nyse.com ]LC MTools /PlatformViewer.aspselectednode chp%5lF1 %51'4&manual- % 2IF
lcm%2Fscctions%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F.
134. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Dcl. 2006).
135. See MFIVIN ARON I ISENBFRG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BtSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
642 (9th ed. 2005).
136. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2008).
137. See BEBCIlUK & FRIED, supra note 52.
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was unmasked as something far less stellar, executives have nevertheless
largely been able to keep the money, while the economy has crashed. 138
One initiative that would seek to marshal extra-legal forces is "say on
pay," in which shareholders get a non-binding vote on executive
compensation. In the United Kingdom, such votes are mandator, and some
research suggests that these votes can have an effect. 139 Some companies
have voluntarily held "say on pay" votes; the Obama Administration has
proposed requiring such votes, 140 and the TARP program does require such
votes for companies receiving TARP funds.1 41
There is evidence that extra-legal forces-here, marshalling norms and
outrage-could be effective in curtailing executive pay. Indeed, norms and
outrage seem like plausible candidates to explain why European executive pay
is so much lower than US executive pay: American corporate executives tend
to earn much more than comparable European executives, in both absolute
terms and relative to lower-level employees. 42 There are many potential
explanations for this difference. However, one important explanation may be
greater hostility among a variety of groups in Germany to high executive
pay- 143
Law on the books and as enforced by judges has a hard time with
executive compensation precisely because we do not know how to articulate
what counts as appropriate compensation, nor how to specify a procedure
that will yield a determination we can and should respect. But excessive
compensation may be something that we "know (at least well enough) when
we see." Indeed, several executives have already given back some portion of
138. For a variant of this argument, see RI(CILMD \. POSNER, \ FAILLRLE OF (APITALISI: T1IE
CRISIS OF '08 AND 1IE DESCENT INTO0 DEPREssioN 93 100 (2009).
139. Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the
U.K., (June 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm-abstract id- 1420394. lerri and Maber find that while the legislation did
not result in a "change in the level and growth rate of CEO pay after the adoption of say
on pay," there was an "increase in its [CEO compensation's] sensitivity to poor
performance," particularly in "firms with excess CEO pay" and in "firms with high voting
dissent." Id. at Abstract.
140. See David lawder, Congress Gets Obama "Sqy on Pqy" Proposal, RFLTFRS, Jul. 16, 2009,
http://www. reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRI ' 561"6\"J20090716.
141. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 7001, Pub. L. No. 111 5, 123 Stat.
115 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2006)). The SEC's interpretive guidance on this
provision is available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/arrainterp.htm.
142. Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamophosis of "Germany Inc. " The Case of Executive Pa, 49 A\M. J.
CoMrp. L. 497, 508-09 (2001).
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their compensation, thanks to pressure and perhaps, to pre-empt litigation.
Angelo Mozilo, former head of Countrywide Financial Corporation, maker of
many defaulting subprime loans, comes to mind,144 as do many of the
recipients of bonuses from AIG.145 Of course, for any CEO or other bonus
recipient that has returned some money, many others who have not done so
come to mind. The penumbra needs to gain force and focus in this regard.
Preliminary indications are mixed, but there have been some encouraging
developments. The effects of the law's attempts, in this time of crisis, to
address compensation may reverberate. Consider in this regard the recent
decision holding that plaintiffs could proceed with their claim that a severance
package to the departing Citigroup CEO was corporate waste. 146 Then again,
this decision is filled with business judgment rhetoric that shows little to no
outrage at the tremendous bungling of risk management that destroyed
billions of dollars of shareholder value and helped send the U.S. financial
system into its worst crisis since the Great Depression. Consider, too, the
public pronouncements by President Obama and other government officials
against excessive compensation, and of course, the stimulus legislation's
inclusion of caps on compensation. One article's title is apt: In Curbing Pqa',
Obama Seeks to Alter Coporate Culture.141 Then again, so far the Obama
administration has not figured out effective forms of regulation of pay,148 and
there is strong opposition, both in boardrooms and in the political sphere.
Pay limits are quite controversial, even among those who think executive pay
144. Alex Veiga, Countgide's lozi/o Foregoing S37.5 Al/lion, SIGATF.COM, Jan. 27, 2008,
http: /www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.ci?f- /n/a/2008/01 /27 /financial/ f211557S93.L)
TL. Countrvwide was taken over by Bank of America, See Jodv Shenn, Bank ofAmeuia
Says Thank Goodness'Jor Countyrvide, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www.bloom
bcrg.com/ apps/ newspid-20601087&sid-aDc2IcgvIIQI&refcr-home.
145. See I reifeld, supra note 7.
146. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Deriv. litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
147. Stephen Labaton & Vikas Bajaj, In Curbing Pay, Obalva Seeks to Alter Cotporate Culture, N.Y.
TiM tEs, Feb. 5, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimcs.com/2009/02/05/us
/politics/ 05pay. html.
148. There have been other developments. Kenneth Feinberg, the Obama Administration's
"pay czar," has restricted the compensation of executives at companies receiving
government bailouts. The Federal Reserve has proposed rules aimed at discouraging pay
that rewards risk taking at organizations it regulates. Stephen Labaton, Fed Plans to Vet
Banker Pa' to Discourage Risky Practices, N.Y. TIMtES, Oct. 23, 2009, at \1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/business/23pay.html. On the Federal Reserve's
proposed rules, see also 1Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Fed. Res.
Issues Proposed Guidance on Incentive Comp. (Oct. 22, 2009)
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is generally too high. 149  We take no position as to whether particular
legislation or court decisions are appropriate or correct in their curbs of, and
responses to, executive compensation. We do, however, support what we
think is one felicitous consequence of all the attention now focused on the
issue: pressure on corporate boards to make compensation decisions that pass
a "smell test."
CONCLUSION
Boards of directors are charged with monitoring company management.
This monitoring function has expanded greatly in recent decades. Once,
boards had a much greater proportion of insiders than they do today; hence,
they would effectively have been monitoring "their own." Thus, their focus
was mainly on strategic decision-making, not monitoring. Today boards play
a greater role, with outside directors expected to closely scrutinize the
performance of corporate officers. Yet even with the growth of outside
directors, boards consist largely of people selected by the management, with
kindred worldviews. Directors are not only typically beholden to company
management for their director jobs; they also may follow a pernicious golden
rule, doing unto the management as they would have the management, in
their capacities as directors of other companies, do unto them. Thus,
decisions may be too readily rubber-stamped, approved without the necessary
critical mindset. Norms of deferring to management and approving generous
compensation packages are created and entrenched. The kindred world-views
mean that directors see the world from the same overall perspective as do the
managers-this, too, can be a source of less-than-critical oversight over
management's decisions.
That directors are typically deferential to management, and see the world
much as managers do, is a significant problem for corporate law. Corporate
law's principal doctrinal mantra for directors-abide by the duties of care and
loyalty-has not done much to help. Carelessness (not giving enough
attention to a decision) and traditionally conflicted transactions (putting the
corporation's money in one's own pocket) are what these duties most directly
address, but they are not what is at issue here. Emerging doctrine might be
offering another approach. We argued in two earlier papers 50 that the
149. See, e.g., ]Lucian Bebchuk, Op-I d., Congress Gets Punitive on Exetive Pay, W\IL ST. J., Feb.
16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123483031127995587.html.
150. See supra note 3.
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emerging category of "good faith," characterized by the recent case of Stone v.
Ritter1 51 as part of the duty of loyalty, might provide a doctrinal home to this
middle ground, establishing rules and standards to assess director conduct
that shareholders might find problematic. Recent cases suggest the "home"
may be none too hospitable to the types of problems we think need
addressing. Still, these cases may not represent the final word.
Even if good faith comes to be developed more expansively, law on the
books and as enforced cannot do all that is needed. It can address some of
the most egregious cases where directors further their own interests at the
expense of the corporation's, but it cannot address the more commonplace
cases in which directors are deferring too much to management. Delaware
corporate law therefore needs, and has, a penumbra-a force influencing
director behavior by means other than the imposition of liability or the threat
thereof. When directors decide how to behave, they look to the law and the
penumbra. They make a broader inquiry than that required to avoid liability,
taking into account what judges favor, the (cautious) advice they receive from
law firms, what various corporate communities favor, and so on. Extra-legal
forces, particularly those marshaled when Delaware judges make statements
other than those that create law, thus have significant weight.
We think that a great deal of problematic director behavior that is
infeasible or undesirable to address through law on the books and as enforced
can most feasibly be addressed through the penumbra. We think, as well, that
the penumbra is broadening to encompass more of such behavior; the quote
with which we started this Article provides an example. It is likely that the
company was more chastened, and others were more affected, than would
have been the case had the opinion been drier and stuck more closely to the
doctrine's application to the facts. Thus, we are optimistic that the penumbra
will prove an important force in reigning in executive compensation so that it
appropriately rewards performance that truly furthers the corporation's long-
term interests. We are optimistic, too, that the penumbra can complement
the other forces making corporate governance more responsive to
corporations' true principals.
151. 911 A.2d 362, 370 (DCl. 2006).
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